SUCCESSFUL I.R.S. CHALLENGES TO DEAN AND
CROWN: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE FOR
INTEREST-FREE LOANS?

In two recent cases, Hardee v. United States and Dickman v.
Commissioner, the Internal Revenue Service successfully challenged the favorable income and gift tax treatment accorded interest-free loans. This Comment examines the history of the
interest-free loan cases and the various interpretationsof the Internal Revenue Code. The comment concludes that although the
InternalRevenue Service position that interest-free loans are taxable events may be logically defensible, the present favorable
treatment will prevail until Congress enacts specific statutes dictating otherwise.
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, interest-free loans have become an important
tax planning device. They are a valuable perquisite for corporate
shareholders and employees,' and have been increasingly utilized
as an estate and gift tax planning tool.2 The proliferation of interest-free or below-market-rate loans 3 in these areas is due in large
1. See generally Herskovitz, Techniques Available to Shield the High Income
of the "Superstar," 34 J. TAX'N 270, 273 (1971). For an article describing the use of
company loans to key employees for stock purchases or to help defray costs of
moving, see Rankin, A Blow to Interest-FreeLoans, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1982, at
F15, col. 1. For an article discussing the use of interest-free loans to sports "superstars", see Andresky, Don't Look Back, Someone May Be Gaining on You, FORBES,
Aug. 2, 1982, at 68; see also Duhl & Fine, New Case Allowing Interest Deductions
CallsforReappraisalof No-Interest Loans, 44 J. TAx'N 34 (1976); Bus. WK.,Nov. 9,
1974, at 162.
2. See generally Note, The Interest-FreeLoam: An Effective Gift and Estate
PlanningDevice, 10 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 709 (1979); Mandelman & Heber, Interest-Free
Loans: The Gift and Estate Tax Planners'Dream-Are We About to Be Awakened?, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 367 (1982); Taicher, How To Use Interest-Free Loans In
Family Tax Planning, 11 PRc. AccT. 24 (1978).
3. The federal government itself uses low interest loans as part of its economic aid programs, especially in the areas of disaster loans, economic redevelopment, and housing subsidies. See, e.g., Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L No. 87-70, 75
Stat. 149; H. AARON, SHELTER AND SUBSIEs: WHO BENEFITS FROM FEDERAL HousING POLICIES? 128-33 (1972).
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part to the favorable precedents established in Dean v. Commissioner4 and Crown v. Commissioner.5
In Dean, the Tax Court held that "an interest-free loan results
in no taxable gain to the borrower ...,,6As a result, the recipient of an interest-free loan need not include the value of the use
of the money in his income, and thus receives tax-free what may
be a substantial benefit. In Crown, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a taxpayer who lends money to his children
and other relatives in the form of interest-free demand loans does
not make a taxable gift.7 This decision permits the transfer of a
valuable economic benefit without any gift tax liability. The ability to avoid gift taxes, coupled with the interest-free loan's income-splitting potential, provides an effective tax shelter for those
who use this technique. 8
Understandably, the Internal Revenue Service has taken exception to these judicially created "loopholes" in the tax laws. Since
the decisions in Dean and Crown, the Commissioner has challenged similar transactions with the hope of convincing the courts
that these loopholes must be closed. The Commissioner has had
only limited success in persuading the courts of the weaknesses
of Dean and Crown, despite the critical reaction these decisions
have received from the commentators.9
This Comment briefly reviews the major cases which have considered the income and gift tax consequences of interest-free
loans, and examines two recent cases which have created uncertainty for taxpayers. In Hardee v. United States,o the Court of
Claims departed from Dean and held that the taxpayer had realized a taxable economic benefit as a result of an interest-free
loan. This Internal Revenue Service victory, however, was shortlived. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit subse4. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
5. 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), afd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
6. 35 T.C. at 1090.
7. 585 F.2d at 235.
8. Pulliam, Income and Gift Tax Implications of Nonbusiness Interest-Free
Loans: Looking a Gift Horse In the Mouth, 58 TAxEs 675, 676 (1980).
9. See generally Keller, The Tax Consequences of Interest-FreeLoans From
Corporationsto Shareholders and From Employers to Employees, 19 B.C.L. REV.
231 (1978); Schlifke, Taxing As Income the Receipt of Interest-FreeLoans, 33 U.
Cm. L.REV. 346 (1966); O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-FreeLoans, 27 VAND. L.
REV.1085 (1974); Comment, Gross Income-InterestFree Loans, 13 MERCER L. REV.
421 (1962); Duhl & Fine, Interest-FreeLoans and the Tax Court: Is Dean Weakening Under IRS Attacks?, 51 J. TAX'N 322 (1979); Sneed, Unlabeled Income and Section 483, 1965 S. CAL. TAx INsT. 643; Pulliam, supra note 8; Note, supra note 2;
Joyce & Del Cotto, Interest-Free Loans: The Odyssey of a Misnomer, 35 TAx L
REV. 459 (1980).
10. 50 A.F.TJ.2d (P-H) 82-5252 (Ct. CL Trial Judge's Op., July 6, 1982) rev'd, 52
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 83-5022 (1983).
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quently reversed the only decision in more than twenty years to
adopt the Internal Revenue Service position."
The Eleventh Circuit rejected Crown in Dickman v. Commissioner,12 and held that interest-free loans are subject to the gift
tax. This victory for the Internal Revenue Service may also prove
to be short-lived because the Supreme Court has agreed to hear
the case.
The Comment concludes that although Hardee and Dickman
have temporarily created uncertainties as to the correct tax treatment of interest-free loans, in the final analysis the rules in Dean
and Crown will prevail.
THE INCOME TAX

J. Simpson Dean
In Dean v. Commissioner,'3 the Tax Court considered for the
first time whether an interest-free loan might constitute income to
the recipient. The taxpayers in Dean borrowed more than two
million dollars from their controlled corporation.14 The Commissioner contended that the taxpayers had received a taxable economic benefit from the free use of corporate funds which should
be included in gross income. 15 The benefit would be measured by
the amount of interest paid for the funds had they been borrowed
at the prime rate.16 The Commissioner relied on a series of cases
holding that rent-free use of corporate property may result in the
realization of income.1 7
11. 52 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 83-5022 (1983).
12. 690 F.2d 812 (11th Cir. 1982), cert granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983).
13. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
14. Id. at 1088.
15. "Gross income" is defined as "all income from whatever source derived. . . ." I.C. § 61(a) (1976). See Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49
(1949) ("[t]he income taxed is described in sweeping terms and should be broadly
construed in accordance with an obvious purpose to tax income comprehensively"). In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, the Court discussed section 61's
predecessor, section 22(a) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code:
This Court has frequently stated that this language was used by Congress
to exert in this field "the full measure of its taxing power." But Congress
applied no limitations as to the source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive
labels as to their nature. And the Court has given a literal construction to
this broad phraseology in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax
all gains except those specifically exempted.
348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955) (citations omitted).
16. 35 T.C. at 1087.
17. Id. at 1089; see also Frueauff v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 449 (1934) (rent-

The Tax Court refused to accept this analogy. The court reasoned that even though an economic benefit may have been conferred on the taxpayer who borrows corporate funds, an interest
deduction of equal amount would offset the increase in income
and thereby eliminate any additional tax liability. As further justification for its decision, the court cited cases holding that interest-free loans result in no interest deduction for the borrower 8 or
interest income to the lender.19
Both the concurring and the dissenting opinions expressed reservations with the majority approach. Judge Opper's concurrence
considered the generalization that "an interest-free loan results in
no taxable gain to the borrower" too broad.20 He further indicated
that although in many cases any imputed income might be offset
by a corresponding interest deduction, this would not always be
the case. For example, section 265(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 disallows a deduction for interest on indebtedness
incurred to purchase or carry tax-exempt securities.
Judge Bruce, in his dissenting opinion, adopted the Commissioner's position, likening interest to rent insofar as "it represents
compensation paid for the use. . . of money."'21 Judge Bruce added that the taxpayer should be required to plead and prove that
if interest had been paid on the loans, it would have been
22
deductible.
The Dean holding-that an interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower-provided an incentive for taxpayers to
use this device in tax planning. The interest-free loan allows the
taxpayer to withdraw-that is, borrow-funds from his corporation without recognition of additional compensation or dividend
income. Furthermore, because only the individual taxpayer must
free use of corporation's apartment); Reynard Corporation v. Commissioner, 30
B.T.A. 451 (1934) (rent-free use of corporation's house); Rodgers Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 66 (1950) (personal use of corporation's automobile); cf.
Silverman v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1061 (1957), affid, 253 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1958)

(payment of wife's travel expenses by employer); Greenspon v. Commissioner, 23
T.C. 138 (1954), rev'd on othergrounds, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956) (farm expenses
paid by corporation).
18. 35 T.C. at 1090; see D. Loveman & Son Export Corp. v. Commissioner, 34
T.C. 776, 806 (1960); Rainbow Gasoline Corp. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 1050, 1060
(1935).
19. 35 T.C. at 1090; see Combs Lumber v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 339, 342-43
(1940); Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 416, 447 (1960).
20. 35 T.C. at 1091 (Opper, J., concurring).
21. Id. (Bruce, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 1092. Some commentators suggest that in addition to I.R.C. § 265(2),
cited by Judges Opper and Bruce, other code sections could be utilized to preclude the offsetting interest deduction assumed by the majority in Dean. See, e.g.,
Keller, supra note 9, at 236-37; O'Hare, supra note 9, at 1095; Schlifke, supra note 9,
at 349.50.
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report income generated by these funds, the corporate tax is
avoided.
The CircuitsParade
Twelve years after the decision in Dean, the Commissioier announced his non-acquiescence. 23 Thus began a belated assault on
Dean. The Commissioner's initial efforts to undermine Dean,
however, proved unsuccessful as the Tax Court routinely applied
the doctrine of stare decisis when presented with an interest-free
loan question. 24
It was not until 1980 that a federal appellate court considered
the interest-free loan issues presented in Dean. In Suttle v. Commissioner,25 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals approved the
analysis in Dean. In the two years following Suttle, five other cir26
cuit courts adopted the Dean approach to interest-free loans.
Each of these cases involved low-interest or interest-free loans
from a corporation to its employees or shareholders.
In Suttle v. Commissioner, the Fourth Circuit refused to modify
the tax treatment of interest-free loans or to offer a clear explanation of the underlying rationale. 27 The Suttle court affirmed the
Tax Court decision, stating simply: "We find the Dean rationale
to be persuasive as applied to the facts of this case." 28 The court
failed to respond to nineteen years of critical comment and declined to provide guidance as to which factual situations, if any,
would give rise to taxable income from interest-free loans.
The Commissioner's second attempt to persuade an appellate
court to reconsider the Dean precedent came one year later in
23. 1973-2 C.B. 4.
24. Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 317 (1979); Martin v. Commissioner, 39
T.C.M. (CCH) 531 (1979), aOd, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Creel v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1173 (1979), affd sub nom. Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133
(5th Cir. 1981); Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931 (1979), aft'd, 670 F.2d 123
(9th Cir. 1982).
25. 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980).
26. Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Beaton v. Commissioner, 664 F.2d 315 (lst Cir. 1981); Commissioner v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123 (9th
Cir. 1982); Baker v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1982); Parks v. Commissioner, 686 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1982).
27. 625 F.2d 1127. In Suttle, the court faced virtually the same factual situation
as in Dean: the taxpayer had received substantial interest-free loans from his
closely held corporation.
28. Id. at 1128.

Martin v. Commissioner.2 9 In Martin, the Fifth Circuit recognized
the "logical anomalies*and disparities of the Dean rule, and the
extensive commentary critical of it,"30 yet declined to depart from

or modify Dean. The court cited three factors as contributing to
its decision to follow Dean: first, complexities in determining
gross income would add uncertainty as to the tax consequences of
a transaction; second, Dean had been followed for twenty years
without exception and had already been affirmed by the Fourth
Circuit; and third, replacing the Dean rule at this time would create a loss of uniformity in the application of the tax law.3 1 The
majority's only substantive comment came in a reaction to the
dissenting opinion:
[T]he proposed solution substitutes one fiction (i.e., that interest is
"paid," which then is "deducted") for the Dean fiction (i.e., that the interest-free loan ipso facto does not produce benefits that under normal tax
regulation result in taxable income because
the alleged benefit is equalled
32
by a comparable interest "deduction").

This statement by the Fifth Circuit is significant in two respects.
First, it dismisses the dissent's detailed analysis of the tax code
as mere fiction without offering any alternative analysis. Second,
and perhaps more importantly, the court characterizes the interest-free (and now tax-free) use of corporate funds as an alleged
benefit. If in fact there is no benefit to be derived from the free
use of someone else's money, all further inquiries become moot
because there is no income to tax.
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Goldberg chastised the majority for
its "blatant and completely needless abdication of their judicial
responsibility, in choosing to transform a transient mistake into
an error of law for perpetuity."3 3 In response to the majority's unwillingness to overrule the long-standing precedent established in
Dean, Judge Goldberg said: "[Fjederal appellate judges are not
bound by the chains of lower court decisions, and indeed are
charged with the responsibility of correcting errors in those decisions."3 4 He then offered a detailed analysis of the issues involved in interest-free loans to support his criticism of the
29. 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981) (consolidating Martin v. Commissioner, 39
T.C.M. (CCH) 531 (1979); Creel v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1173 (1979); Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009 (1979)). In each case, the taxpayers were officers, directors,
salaried employees and principal shareholders who had received interest-free
loans from the corporation.
30. 649 F.2d at 1133.
31. Id. at 1134. The court's concerns included: "at what rate, and how should
the 'interest' benefit allowed be calculated, for purposes of both gross income and
the counter-balancing deduction."
32. Id. at 1133-34.
33. Id. at 1134 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 1144.
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35
majority and to formulate the solution they rejected as 'fiction."
The Commissioner's position consists of a literal application of
Internal Revenue Code sections 61 and 163(a). Gross income as
defined in section 61 includes "all income from whatever source
derived." 36 The provisions of section 61 are intended to be
broadly construed. The Commissioner then makes the analogy to
cases holding that rent-free use of corporate assets and other employment-related fringe benefits constitute gross income under
section 61.37
The Commissioner's second argument is that section 163(a),
which establishes a deduction for all interest "paid or accrued,"3 8
is inapplicable to the recipient of an interest-free loan. "By definition, the government argues, a taxpayer who receives an 'interestfree' loan neither pays nor accrues interest." 39
The result of this discrete analysis of the two relevant code sections is an increase in the taxpayer's net taxable income equal to
the value of ihe interest-free loan. Judge Goldberg concludes that
on a purely "formalistic" level the government has succeeded, but
then criticizes the Commissioner's argument for its failure to reflect the "true economic reality" of the transaction. While accepting the proposition that in substance the taxpayer has
received additional compensation or a dividend from an interestfree loan, he rejects the notion that the offsetting deduction
should be denied for want of payment or accrual. Thus, the deduction should be allowed, except in those cases where the deduction would be denied even if it had been paid.40
Judge Goldberg's dissent focuses on two major errors in Dean.

35. Id. at 1135.
36. LR.C. §§ 61, 163(a) (1976); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
37. Id.; see Gardner v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1980); Atlanta
Biltmore Hotel Corp. v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1965); United Aniline
Co. v. Commissioner, 316 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1963); Rudolph v. United States, 291
F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. dismissed, 370 U.S. 269 (1962); see also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.61-2(d) (1957) (regulating compensation paid other than in cash).
38. 649 F.2d at 1136. Section 163(a) reads as follows: '"There shall be allowed
as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness." I.R.C. § 163(a) (1976).
39. 649 F.2d at 1136.
40. Id. at 1136-37; see supra notes 21, 22 and accompanying text see also LR.C.
§ 163(d) (1976) (Limitation on Interest on Investment Indebtedness); id. § 264
(Certain Amounts Paid in Connection with Insurance Contracts); id. § 267
(Losses, Expenses, and Interest with Respect to Transactions Between Related
Taxpayers).

First, it is error to assume that the imputed interest on an interest-free loan would in all cases be balanced by an equivalent deduction. Second, even if the deduction did exist, the benefit
should not be excluded from gross income under section 61. The
majority's conceptualization of interest-free loans does not give
4
effect to all the relevant provisions of the tax code. 1
To create a situation in which the recipients of interest-free
loans are taxed in the same way as "economically equivalent taxpayers" requires a "two-payment transaction analysis." The recipient of an interest-free loan would include the value of the loan
in gross income, and then claim a deduction of equal amount if
such a deduction would have been available.4 2
The Martin decision is noteworthy because after twenty years
the courts finally offered a comprehensive analysis of Dean. Although this analysis was made in the dissenting opinion, the Fifth
Circuit offered its tacit acknowledgment of possible weaknesses
in Dean. Unfortunately for the Commissioner, even if the majority had accepted Judge Goldberg's analysis of interest-free loans,
the Commissioner would only have been able to tax interest-free
loans in situations where the taxpayer ran afoul of another provision of the tax code.
The First Circuit considered a challenge to Dean in Beaton v.
Commissioner.43 In a per curiam decision, the court refused to
overrule Dean. The Beaton court compared an interest-free loan
made by a corporation to its employee with an interest-bearing
loan accompanied by a corresponding increase in the employee's
compensation. The court recognized that an interest payment
would not in all cases provide an offsetting interest deduction.
Additionally, equating interest-free loans with interest-bearing
notes "may result in a wide disparity in the tax treatment of the
two situations."4 4 However, the First Circuit concluded that it
had not been presented with the factual situation which would re45
quire a modification of Dean.
The court then noted that both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits
had followed Dean.46 Although appreciating the criticisms of
Dean, the court nevertheless refused to depart from Dean's holding and thereby created "uncertainty and the uneven application
41. 649 F.2d at 1142.
42. Id. at 1143 (quoting Keller, supra note 9, at 231).

43. 664 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1981).
44. Id. at 317 (quoting Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931, 950 (1979)).
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing Suttle v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980); Martin v.
Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981).
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of the tax law."47 As noted by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Byrum:48
Courts properly have been reluctant to depart from an interpretation of
tax law which has been generally accepted when the departure could have
potentially far-reaching consequences. When a principle of taxation requires re-examination, Congress is better equipped than a court to define
precisely the type of conduct which results in tax consequences. When
courts readily undertake such tasks, taxpayers may not rely with assurance on what appear to be established rules lest they be subsequently
overturned. Legislative enactments, on the other hand, although not al-

ways free from ambiguity, at least afford the taxpayers advance warning.

Beaton seems to leave open the possibility that given the
proper factual situation,4 9 the court might create an exception to
Dean's blanket exclusion of interest-free loans from income. In
essence, this exception would be the "two-payment transaction
analysis" suggested in Martin.50 The Beaton court's reluctance to
wholeheartedly endorse this exception ignores what the courts
have been saying for years: the majority of interest-free loans
would result in no added tax because the increased income is negated by the increased deduction. The argument that this treatment would have "far-reaching consequences" or create
"uncertainty and uneven application of the tax law" fails to recognize that interest-free loans would create additional tax liability
only when the interest deduction is disallowed. The imposition of
the present limitations on interest deductions merely puts the recipient of an interest-free loan on an equal footing with his interest-paying counterpart. In light of this, a court would be justified
in modifying Dean to achieve equity.
In Commissioner v. Greenspun,5 1 the Ninth Circuit was
presented with a slightly varied factual context in which to evaluate the principles established in Dean. Herman Greenspun received a four million dollar loan from Howard Hughes in
exchange for favorable press coverage in the Las Vegas newspaper owned by Greenspun. Rather than being totally interest-free,
47. 664 F.2d at 317.
48. 408 U.S. 125, 135 (1972), quoted in Beaton v. Commissioner, 664 F.2d at 317.
But see Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965) (Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not precluded from taking a position contrary to ah earlier published

position).
49. One possible situation would be a taxpayer acquiring tax-exempt securities with the proceeds of an interest-free loan. See supra text accompanying note
21.
50. See supra text accompanying note 42.
51. 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982).

the loan from Hughes charged one-half of the current market rate
52
of interest.
The Commissioner argued that the favorable loan terms had
been granted by Hughes to compensate Greenspun for services
rendered; therefore, the value of this economic benefit should be
included in Greenspun's gross income. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's determination that although the preferential interest rate represented consideration for services rendered,
the rule in Dean applied and therefore Greenspun realized no
taxable income. The court rejected the Commissioner's standard
argument that section 163 should be invoked to preclude the offsetting interest deduction.53
The Greenspun court's analysis emphasized the precedential
value Dean had acquired over a twenty-year period. Since Dean
was the first case to litigate the interest-free loan issue, the decision merely gave judicial effect to a 48-year-old administrative
practice. Additionally, the Commissioner's failure to appeal the
Dean decision and his twelve-year delay in announcing his nonacquiescence were factors in the decision:
Too much water has passed under the bridge to warrant judicial reexamination of the principles underlying the decision or the problems generated

by it. Where, as here, the Government seeks to modify a principle of taxation so firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence, it should turn to Congress,

54
not to the courts.

Greenspun is significant because the Ninth Circuit's opinion is
devoid of the economic and statutory analysis present in the preceding appellate reviews of Dean. The major portion of the
court's opinion consists of a litany of reasons why the court need
not analyze the facts before it in light of the requirements of the
Internal Revenue Code and congressional intent.
The Second Circuit considered the Dean rule in Baker v. Commissioner.55 The court deferred to Congress for any revision of
the Dean rule for three reasons. First, reversal of this long-accepted decision would "inject nonuniformity into national tax policy."'56 Second, the Commissioner's interpretation of section 163
was "too wooden and formalistic." 57 Third, "consideration of the
52. Id. at 124.
53. Id. at 124-25.
54. Id. at 125-26.
55. 677 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1982).

56. Id. at 12. The court also suggested that a 1978 congressional directive to
the Commissioner not to issue new regulations in the area of fringe benefits was
applicable to interest-free loans. Id. Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 1, 92
Stat. 996, 996, as amended by Act of Dec. 29, 1978, Pub. L. No. 96-167, § 1, 93 Stat.
1275, 1275; Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 801, 95 Stat. 172,
349.
57. 677 F.2d at 12.
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desirability of taxing the value of interest-free loans is beyond the
competence of a court reviewing a limited record, and is more appropriate for legislative scrutiny."5 8
The Baker court's analysis of interest-free loans is contradictory in several respects. The court claimed its incompetence precluded it from abandoning the Dean approach. Therefore, Dean
won by default. The Baker court refused to acknowledge that
Dean had already judicially established the "desirability" of taxing interest-free loans. However, when the court considered the
Commissioner's contention that no deduction would be available
under section 163, the court summoned enough competence to reject it. Perhaps Baker's only significant contribution to this series
of cases lies in the urgency of its plea for legislative assistance.
The next circuit court to consider Dean was the Sixth Circuit in
Parksv. Commissioner. 9 The court recognized that five other circuits had rejected the Commissioner's position. Conceding that
the Commissioner's attack on Dean was not without merit, the
Sixth Circuit nevertheless felt compelled to follow the lead of the
other circuits. The court indicated that a "well-entrenched interpretation of tax law, even if logically assailable, should be
changed by Congress, not the courts." 60 The court found that
61
Byrum controlled, and ruled in favor of the taxpayer.
The Commissioner's two-year parade through the circuits was
futile. In each of the cases challenging Dean, the Commissioner's
approach was rejected. Although several of the courts recognized
the inadequacies of Dean, none of the cases they considered
presented a factual situation which would permit even a modification of the Dean rule. In this respect, the Commissioner failed,
not the courts. Additionally, while the Commissioner's all-out attack may have been calculated to find a court sympathetic to his
argument, the Dean precedent emerged stronger than before.
The Court of Claims
The Commissioner's only success in his efforts to tax the value
of an interest-free loan to the recipient came in a case tried in the
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 13.
686 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 409.
Id.

Court of Claims. In Hardee v. United States,62 the trial judge
found that the taxpayer had realized taxable income because he
had received interest-free use of money.
The taxpayer was the president and majority shareholder of a
closely held corporation, and he had borrowed more than a half
million dollars from the corporation through non-interest bearing
notes. During the period of the loans, the taxpayer held tax-free
municipal bonds with costs nearly equal to his loan balance. The
Commissioner maintained that the taxpayer had realized an economic benefit equal to the interest not charged on the loans and
assessed a deficiency. The taxpayer paid the deficiency and sued
in the Court of Claims for a refund.63
The Court of Claims began its analysis by examining Dean together with the cases dealing with rent-free use of corporate property. The court found that the use of a corporate asset without a
corresponding obligation to pay for that use results in a taxable
economic benefit. The Dean analysis also accepts this proposition
"but for" the corresponding interest deduction that would have
been available had interest been charged.64 From this point, the
Court of Claims' analysis departs from that of the Tax Court.
If the economic benefit of an interest-free loan is to yield no
taxable income, the crucial issue is whether a statutory or economic basis exists for allowing an offsetting deduction. 65 First,
under section 163(a), the taxpayer had no cost of borrowing, and
therefore was not entitled to a deduction. 66 Furthermore, the assumption that an interest-free loan is equivalent to the situation
in which the cost of a loan is covered by an increase in compensation 67 would not change the result.68 'The propriety of a deduction does not turn upon general equitable considerations, such as
a demonstration of effective economic and practical equivalence.
Rather, it 'depends upon legislative grace; and only as there is
clear provision therefor can any particular deduction be al62. 50 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 82.5252, rev'd, 52 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 83-5022 (1983).
63. Id. at 82-5253. The reason the taxpayer chose to pay the tax and sue for a
refund is not clear. It is possible that because the taxpayer held interest-free securities, he was concerned that the Tax Court would consider this situation an exception to Dean. It is also possible that the IRS had overlooked certain issues in
the original audit, and that the taxpayers, as a matter of strategy, decided to accept the original audit adjustments and to litigate this one limited issue. See
Rankin, supra note 1.
64. 50 A.F.T.R.2d at 82-5253-55.
65. Id. at 82-5255-56.
66. ILd.
67. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.

68. 50 A.F.T.R.2d at 82-5255.
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lowed.'- 69 It is irrelevant that the loans might have been struc70
tured differently.
Second, the court criticized Dean because "it substitutes one
economic dislocation for another."71 If an interest-free borrower
recognizes income measured by the interest value of the loan and
is also denied an offsetting deduction, then he is in a less
favorable position than a borrower whose loans generate interest
deductions. 72 However, the correction of this imbalance under
Dean has the equally disproportionate effect of allowing the interest-free borrower to enjoy the benefits of a loan with no adverse
economic consequences whatsoever.7 3
The court rejected Dean and accepted the Commissioner's contention that the taxpayer had realized an increase in taxable income as a result of the interest-free loans.74 The issue of whether
the taxpayer's ownership of tax-exempt securities would create
an exception to Dean was not decided because the court held that
income must be recognized on all interest-free borrowings regard75
less of how the funds are used.
The Hardee analysis starts on the same path as the analysis of
the circuit courts. However, Hardee differs with respect to the imputed interest deduction which is the underpinning of the Dean
rationale. The Court of Claims adopted the interpretation of section 163 that the circuit courts had considered "too wooden and
formalistic." 76 The Hardee court acknowledged that its decision
would place the interest-free borrower in a less favorable position
compared to his interest-paying counterpart.7 7 This result could
have bhen avoided had the court adopted the two-payment transaction analysis proposed by Judge Goldberg.78 Because the taxpayer had invested in tax-exempt securities, the trial judge had
before him the factual situation that the circuit courts suggested
was needed to modify Dean. Instead of shifting the inequity of
69. Id. (quoting Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating, 417 U.S. 134,
148-49 (1974)).

70. Id. at 82-5255.
71. Id. at 82-5255-56.
72. Id. at 82-5256; see also 649 F.2d at 1137 n.12 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
73. 50 A.F.T.R2d at 82-5256.
74. Id. The amount of additional tax was not determined because the record

before
75.
76.
77.
78.

the court did not contain information needed to compute it.
Id. at 82-5253.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
50 A.F.T.R.2d at 82-5256.
See supra notes 51-52.

the tax law from one category of taxpayers to another, the Court
of Claims could have created equity for all taxpayers.
The Commissioner's success in Hardee still had to withstand
appellate scrutiny. If the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
were to affirm the Court of ClaimS79 decision, a direct conflict with
the other circuits would result. In the meantime, taxpayers were
faced with uncertainty as to the tax consequences of interest-free
loans.
The FederalCircuit
In a split decision, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reversed the decision of the Court of Claims, holding that the taxpayer did not realize income from the receipt of interest-free
loans.8 0 The decision advanced several reasons for rejecting the
analysis of the Court of Claims.
The majority opinion interpreted Dean as holding that "the definition of taxable income does not encompass the benefit of... an
interest-free loan."8 1 Consequently, the court did not have to consider whether a statutory basis exists for an imputed interest deduction to offset income resulting from an interest-free loan.
Likewise, this "income defining" interpretation of Dean relieves
the taxpayer of concern over limitations on the deductibility of
imputed interest, such as where the taxpayer used the loan proceeds to purchase tax exempt securities. 82
The longevity of the Dean rule and its subsequent approval by
six circuit courts also weighed heavily in the Federal Circuit's decision. The court noted that for nearly fifty years the Commissioner had not attempted to tax interest-free loans. 83 Moreover,
for the past twenty years all attempts beginning with Dean have
been rebuffed by the courts. The court stated that a change at
this time would create uncertainty for taxpayers who had arranged business and personal transactions with the expectation
that interest-free loans would not give rise to taxable income.8 4
The Federal Circuit concluded that any change in the Dean rule
79. On October 1, 1982, the U.S. Court of Claims was replaced by the U.S.
Claims Court whose decisions are appealable to the new Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-164,
§ 127(a), 96 Stat. 25, 37-38 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. 1295(a) (3)). For a discussion
of the effect of this Act on taxpayers in selecting a tax forum, see Jones &Singer,
Changes in Procedure,Strategy Due in New FederalCircuit and Revamped Claims
Court, 57 J. TAX'N 136 (1982).
80. Hardee v. United States, 52 A.F.T.l2d (P-H) 83-5022 (1983).

81. Id. at 83-5025.
82. Id.

83. Id. at 83-5024.
84. Id. at 83-5027.

[VOL. 20: 875, 1983]

Comment
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

should come from Congress rather than the courts. 85

Two judges dissented, stating that the majority erroneously extended the Dean rule by excluding the imputed income from interest-free loans regardless of the availability of an interest
deduction. The dissenting judges urged that the integrity of the
Internal Revenue Code section 265(2) should be maintained and
recognized as a limitation on the Dean rule.86

Judge Kashiwa's dissenting opinion pointed out that Hardee
was actually a case of first impression, independent of Dean, because of the taxpayer's use of interest-free loans to purchase or
carry tax-exempt securities.8 7
The Federal Circuit's decision in Hardee is likely to end the
Commissioner's attempts to tax interest-free loans. The Court of
Claims had accepted the Commissioner's contention that there is
no basis for an imputed interest deduction which would offset the
income resulting from receipt of an interest-free loan. The availability of this deduction was thought to be essential to the outcome
in Dean.88
In Hardee, the Commissioner finally presented the court with a
factual situation in which the taxpayer could be denied an imputed interest deduction because of his investment in tax-exempt
securities. However, the Federal Circuit's holding that the definition of taxable income does not include the benefit of an interestfree loan made this determination unnecessary.
THE GI=T TAX

Crown v. Commissioner
In Crown v. Commissioner,89 the Seventh Circuit affirmed a Tax
Court decision that no taxable gift results from interest-free demand loans among family members. Lester Crown was an equal
partner with his two brothers in Areljay Company, an unincorporated business. Areljay made loans totalling eighteen million dollars to trusts established for the benefit of the partners' children
and other relatives. No interest was paid or demanded on any of
85. Id. at 83-5024.
86. Id. at 83-5028 (Markey, CJ., dissenting), and 83-5037
dissenting).
87. Id. at 83-5028 (Kashiwa, J., dissenting).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 20, 22, 40, and 49.
89. 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).

(Kashiwa, J.,

the loans which were either on open account or represented by
demand notes. 90
The Commissioner determined that the loans from Areljay to
the trusts constituted gifts equal to the value of the use of the
money loaned. The amount of the gifts was computed by applying a six percent interest rate to the loan balances outstanding
during the year.91 The Commissioner then allocated one-third of
92
this amount as gifts made by each partner.
The Commissioner argued that the value of the interest-free
loans constituted the transfer of an economic benefit which, as a
matter of sound tax policy, should be subject to the gift tax. The
Commissioner advanced two policy reasons for this position:
first, because one of the purposes of the gift tax is to protect the
income tax, imposition of the tax would discourage income-splitting among family members.9 3 Second, the gift tax is intended to
ensure the effectiveness of the estate tax by preventing the depletion of the taxable estate before death.94
Although the Seventh Circuit conceded the validity of these
policy arguments, it nevertheless indicated that the Commissioner had failed to demonstrate that "the taxation of such loans
is within the contemplation of the gift tax statute."9 5 The court
then rejected each of three alternative theories advanced by the
Commissioner for applying the gift tax statutes to interest-free
loans: the "unequal exchange" theory, the "property right" the96
ory, and the "continuous gift" theory.
Under the "unequal exchange" theory, interest-free loans fall
within the parameters of section 2512(b) governing transfers of
97
This arproperty for less than full and adequate consideration.
90. Id. at 235. Approximately 13 percent of the loan amounts were represented
by demand notes with the remaining 87 percent consisting of loans on open
account.
91. Id. The LR.S. contended that a reasonable rate of interest for 1967 would
be 6 percent and computed the gift by applying that rate to the daily balance of

loans outstanding during the year. This computation resulted in gifts from Areljay
to the trusts totalling $1,086,408 for the year. Id.

92. Id.
93. Id. at 235-36. See M.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1932), reprinted
in 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 457; S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1932), reprinted
in 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 496. See generally LoWNDES, KRAMER & McCoRD, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GrFT TAXES, §§ 22.2, 26.15 (3d ed. 1974); Harris, Legislative History of

FederalGift Taxation, 18 TAXES 531, 533 (1940).
94. 585 F.2d at 236.
95. Id. at 237.
96. Id. at 237-40.
97. Section 2512(b) reads in pertinent partWhere property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount by which the value of
the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall be deemed a
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gument rests on the proposition that a promise to pay money in
the future (on demand) cannot equal the face value of the promise simply because of the time value of money. The court rejected
the "unequal exchange" theory on the ground that the Commissioner had not produced any evidence that demand notes traded
at a significant discount in the marketplace.9 8
The second theory advanced by the Commissioner was that the
grant of free use of money until repayment is demanded constitutes an outright gift of a taxable "property right." A borrower's
interest in the money loaned is analogized to the real property
"tenancy at will" interest. The Seventh Circuit rejected this theory, however, because the borrower has no "legally protectible interest vis-A-vis the lender."9 9 Even if such an at-will interest
exists, the value of this interest cannot be determined at the time
of the loan. 00
The "continuous gift" theory maintains that a gift to the borrower occurs continuously for as long as the lender does not demand repayment. This approach coincides with the formula used
by the Commissioner to measure the amount and timing of the
gift. The Seventh Circuit rejected the "continuous gift" theory because equating the mere use of property with the transfer of a
property right would be an unwarranted expansion of the concept
of property rights. This theory was unacceptable because it required an imputation of interest where none was owed.' 0 '
The Seventh Circuit then cited several additional factors to support its decision. One was the Commissioner's lack of success in
convincing the courts that granting interest-free loans constitutes
a taxable event in other areas of the tax law.10 2 Another factor
was the "difficult task of determining an appropriate interest
rate" without statutory guidelines and the attendant uncertainties
gift, and shall be included in computing the amount of gifts made during
the calendar year.
LR.C. § 2512(b) (Supp. V 1981).
98. 585 F.2d at 238.
99. Id. at 239.
100. Id. This is because the length of the loan depends upon the discretion of
the lender and the timing of his demand for repayment
101. Id. at 239.40.
102. Id.; see Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961); Saunders v. United
States, 294 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Hawaii 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 450 F.2d 1047
(9th Cir. 1971).

created for taxpayers. 0 3 The court also feared the unlimited potential reach of the Commissioner's position. 0 4 Finally, the court
noted that equitable considerations reinforced its decision, as the
Commissioner had only recently begun to assert that tax-free
loans constitute a taxable gift.105
The decision by the Seventh Circuit-that interest-free demand
loans do not constitute a taxable gift--created many opportunities
for tax planning. First, the lender may provide funds for use by
family members without paying any gift tax on the transfer. Second, the income earned on the borrowed funds is taxable to the
borrower, not to the lender. This yields a net tax savings if the
borrower is in a lower income tax bracket. Finally, the lender retains much flexibility in the use of his funds because they remain
accessible "on demand."
Dickman v. Commissioner
Four years after the Crown decision, the Eleventh Circuit considered the gift tax consequences of intrafamily interest-free
loans in Dickman v. Commissioner.106 The taxpayers in Dickman
had made loans to their son and to a closely held corporation in
exchange for non-interest bearing notes. 0 7 The Commissioner
determined that these loans "resulted in taxable gifts to the extent of the value of the use of the money lent."108 The Tax Court
had concluded that this situation was no different from the one
presented in Crown, and held that no taxable gift resulted.109 The
103. 585 F.2d at 240-41. The court expressed concern that taxpayers would not
know in advance whether a particular loan would give rise to a taxable gift.
104. Id. at 241. The Seventh Circuit speculated that even the loan of a lawnmower to a neighbor might be a gift if the Commissioner's position was adopted.
105. Id. The first challenge to intrafamily interest-free loans by the Internal
Revenue Service was in Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
The district court held that the Johnsons did not make gifts to their children of the
value of the use of the money loaned within the meaning of section 2501. The
court stated that "the right to interest must arise from an express or implied contractual obligation or from statute." 254 F. Supp. at 77. The Commissioner did not
appeal the Johnson decision; however, the Service did issue its non-acquiescence
to the court's ruling seven years later. See Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
106. 690 F.2d 812 (11th Cir. 1982), cert granted, 103 S. Ct. 1811 (1983).
107. Id. at 813. There were two loans not represented by demand notes. One
was a $65,000 loan on "open account" and payable on demand. The second was a
$456,805.90 loan made in 1972 evidenced by a no-interest term note payable on or
before March 28, 1982. Dickman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 620, 622 (1980).
108. 690 F.2d at 814 (footnote omitted). The Commissioner issued statutory notices of gift tax deficiencies for each calendar quarter ending March 31, 1971
through December 31, 1976. The total loan amounts ranged between $740,000 and
$1,100,000 during this six-year period. The Commissioner computed the amount of
the gifts by applying the interest rates set under section 6621 of the Code to the
loan balances outstanding at the end of each quarter. Id.
109. 41 T.C.M. at 623, 624.
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Eleventh Circuit rejected the precedent established in Crown and
overruled the Tax Court." 0
In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit first examined the
scope of the gift tax statutes and concluded that section 2501, 2511
and 2512 cover interest-free loans."' Section 2501 imposes a gift
tax on the transfer of property by gift." 2 Section 2511(a) provides
that the tax shall apply "whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible."" 3 Under section
2512(b) the tax includes all transfers of property for less than adequate and full consideration." 4 The court viewed both the congressional committee reports from the original enactment of the
of
gift tax statutes" 5 and several Supreme Court interpretations
6
the statutes as supporting a broad interpretation."1
The Eleventh Circuit then considered the issue of whether an
interest-free loan is property for gift tax purposes. The court first
concluded that existing case law required gift taxation when a
non-interest bearing term note is used to secure a loan." 7 The
110. 690 F.2d at 813.
111. Id. at 819..
112. Subsection (a) (1) reads as follows: "A tax... is hereby imposed for each
calendar year on the transfer of property by gift during such calendar year by any
individual, resident or nonresident." LR.C. § 2501 (a) (1) (Supp. V 1981).
113. Id. § 2511(a) (1976).
114. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
115. 690 F.2d at 814-15. The congressional committee reports accompanying the
Revenue Act of 1932 declaredThe terms "property," "transfer," "gift" and "indirectly" are used in the
broadest and most comprehensive sense; the term "property" reaching
every species of right or interest protected by law and having an exchangeable value. The words "transfer ... by gift" and "Whether ... direct or indirect" are designed to cover and comprehend all transactions
(subject to certain express conditions and limitations) whereby and to the
extent... that property or a property right is donatively passed to or conferred upon another, regardless of the means or the device employed in Its
accomplishment.
H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B.
457, 476; S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1932), reprintedin 1939-1 (Pt. 2)
C.B. 496, 524.
116. 690 F.2d at 815; see Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945)
("Congress intended to use the term 'gifts' in its broadest and most comprehensive sense... [and] to hit all the protean arrangements which the wit of man can
devise that are not business transactions within the meaning of ordinary
speech. . .

");

Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 180 (1943) ('TM language of

the gift tax statute, 'property... real or personal, tangible or intangible,' is broad
enough to include property, however conceptual or contingent.").
117. 690 F.2d at 816. The court analyzed Blackburn v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204

court then rejected the notion that merely because a loan is payable on demand, the result should be different.18
The Dickman court took exception to the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Crown. First, the court stated that an "at will" interest
is a property interest notwithstanding the absence of rights vis-Avis the lender." 9 Second, it is the right to use money that is the
property right being transferred.120 The gift status of this property right is not changed simply because its value cannot be determined at the time of the loan.'21
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Dickman creates a direct
conflict with the Seventh Circuit's decision in Crown. As a result,
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Dickman.122 In the
interest of judicial economy, other cases addressing the issue of
interest-free demand loans and the gift tax will likely be continued. Taxpayers formerly relying on Crown are now faced with
uncertainty as to the tax consequences of their interest-free de23
mand loans.
CONCLUSION

The Dean and Crown decisions resulted in favorable income
and gift tax treatment of interest-free loans. The Internal Revenue Service, however, has attempted to eliminate the perceived
inequities created by these decisions through repeated challenges. Only recently has the Commissioner been successful.
The Court of Claims decision created uncertainty as to the appropriate income tax treatment of interest-free loans. If the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had affirmed Hardee, the Court
of Claims would have been the only jurisdiction to tax interestfree loans. A conflict among the circuits would certainly lead to
Supreme Court review.
(1953), and Estate of Berkman v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1979). In
Blackburn, the recipient of a term note bearing interest below the prevailing market rate was held to have made a taxable gift to the makers of the note to the extent that the fair market value of the property transferred exceeded the
discounted fair market value of the term note. In Estate of Berkman, the taxpay-

ers made gifts to their daughter, son-in-law and their corporation to the extent
that the cash loaned to them exceeded the fair market value of the term note
received.
118. 690 F.2d at 817.
119. Id. at 818.
120. Id. at 819.
121. Id.
122. 690 F.2d 812 (lth Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3611 (Feb. 22, 1982)
(No. 82-1041).
123. Not all interest-free demand loans would subject the donor to the gift tax.
Many loans would be excluded from taxation under Code sections 2503(b), 2505
and 2513.
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The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the Court of Claims and
offered an expanded interpretation of the Dean rule. Taxpayers
can be assured that the prospect of a successful challenge in another circuit is minimal. Seven of the circuit courts have adopted
Dean and only the Supreme Court or Congress can displace it.
The Supreme Court is unlikely to grant certiorari in Hardee because of the absence of a "real" issue to consider. Therefore, congressional action is the Commissioner's only hope to change the
Dean rule. In light of Congress' reluctance over the past twenty
years to enact legislation changing the Dean result, this prospect
is also unlikely.124
From a tax planning perspective, the Hardee decision seems to
eliminate the potential risks of using interest-free loans. Taxpayers no longer need be concerned with the limitations on interest
deductions because Hardee holds that no income results from interest-free loans.
The Supreme Court will resolve the conflict between the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits over the appropriate gift tax treatment
of interest-free demand loans. The Court must determine
whether these loans constitute the transfer of a property right
within the meaning of the gift tax statutes.
In Crown, the Seventh Circuit decided that because the gift tax
statutes made no explicit references to interest-free loans, these
loans were not taxable gifts. The Eleventh Circuit, however,
based its decision in Dickman on a broad interpretation of the gift
tax statutes.
Congress has had five years to change Crown through legisla124. The Senate Appropriations Committee has "urge d] that the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service refrain from instituting any additional
cases concerning the issue of low-interest loans considered as a benefit equal to
taxable income." The committee then requested a report with regard to the LR.S.
rationale for proceeding in a fashion contrary to court rulings. See TREAsURy, PosTAL SERVICE AND GENERAL GOVERNMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1981, S. REP. No.
955, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1980).
Internal Revenue Code section 269A is an example of legislation enacted to overturn the results of court decisions with which Congress disagreed. In Keller v.
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), the taxpayer formed a personal service corporation in order to obtain tax benefits not available to unincorporated individuals.
The Tax Court held that Code section 482, covering the allocation of income among
taxpayers, was inapplicable to this situation. Congress' response was to enact section 269A permitting the Commissioner to allocate the income and deductions of
personal service corporations in order to clearly reflect income. See Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 250(a), 96 Stat. 324, 528

(to be codified at I!RC. 269A).

tion. The Supreme Court may consider Congress' failure to legislate a different gift tax treatment of interest-free loans a tacit
approval of the Crown result.125 Additionally, the Court may determine that because taxpayers have relied on the Crown holding,
any changes in this area should be left to Congress.
The successful Internal Revenue Service challenges to Dean
and Crown have only temporarily created uncertainty as to the
tax treatment of interest-free loans. When Dickman is resolved
by the Supreme Court, these uncertainties will be eliminated.
Any future changes will come from Congress rather than the
courts.

THOMAS A. DOM13ROWSKI

125. See supra note 124 for a discussion of section 269A. Neither the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, nor the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, included provisions addressing the gift tax treatment of interest-free loans.

